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THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY
NEGTIGENCE AS APPLIED TO THE OCCUPANT
OF A VEHICLE.
One of the n-ost interesting doctrines in the whole body of
law is that of contributory negligence. It is certainly one of
the most fundamental traits of human nature to excuse one's
own fault by alleging the equal fault of the person one has
injured. The foundation of this doctrine can be observed in
any accident between two motorists. The air is immediately
rent with vociferous accusations as to each other's share of
the blame for the occurence. In all probability, two chariot-
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eers crashing together in the narrow streets of ancient Nine-
vah used, much the same language and presented much the
same excuses to the elders sitting at the gates. "It was his
own fault" has been the excuse of the ages, and the law of
contributory negligence has become fixed in all systems. If
the injured party was also careless and contributed to his own
injuries he could not recover. That much is clear even to the
variest tyro in the law.
How far can the doctrine be extended? The important
question discussed by this article is: does it include third per-
sons injured by the concurrent negligence of two others? In
some cases, the matter is clear. The negligence of a servant
in line of duty is imputed to his master; that of a parent is
imputed to his infant child; the negligence of a joint agent
is that of his fellows. About these there is no question.
But today imputed negligence presents a problem of in-
terest to the lawyer and layman alike. Is the contributory
negligence -of the driver of a vehicle to be imputed to his pas-
senger ? One calls a taxi to take him to a train, or a passing
friend offers one a ride home, or the weary hiker along th0
highway gets a "lift" from the kindly passer-by. Suddenly
our peace and bones are shattered by a wreck, and it develops
that our driver, as we are suavely told when we seek monetary
balm for our wounded feelings and bodies, was also careless
and guilty of contributory negligence, and we can recover
nothing.
What do the courts say to this? Their opinions are di-
vided, and it is the purpose of this article to indicate to some
extent this conflict of opinion and note some of the reasons
given by the various courts for their opinions. Today the
264;
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r ajority of Courts hold, with some qualifications, that the
negligence of the driver of a vehicle cannot be imputed to his
passenger, but a minority dissent vigorously from this.
Since the earliest of important decisions in modern times
on this was an English one, it will be proper to view briefly
the English position. The case which first applied the coctrine
that the negligence of the driver is imputable to his passenger,
and which is the starting point of most discussions, whether
for or against the doctrine is Thorogood v. Bryan' decided in
1849. In this case a passenger alighting from a public omni-
bus before it had drawn up to the curb or stopped and he
was struck and killed by another public bus. It was decided
that the driver of the first bus was guilty of contributory
negligence in permitting his passenger to alight while it was
in motion. TLe court held without dissent that the defendant
could not be charged, the driver's negligence being imputed
to the passenger so as to bar his recovery, on the grounds of
contributory negligence. The Court based its decision on the
ground that by selecting tLis particular conveyance the pas-
senger became identified with the driver whose actions be-
came his, and who, so far as third parties were concerned,
was his servant. Eutterfield v. Forrester2 and Bridge v. Grand
Junction Railway Co.3 were cited as authorities. The first,
that of a man Iiding carelessly into an obstruction, was u
simple case of contributory negligence and added nothing to
the subject. The second, that of a passenger injured on a
railroad train, altho a question of procedure is the real issue,
indicates this doctrine of identification. *Neither case really
1. 8 C. B. 115.
2. 11 East. 60.
3. M &W 248.
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raises the issue of constructive contribution to the injury.
The next real discussion of the question was in the Admir-
alty case of The Milan.4 Thorogood v. Bryan was expressly
overruled as being decided on very doubtful grounds. A con-
flict between vaiious cases followed, with the case of Arm-
strong v. Lancashire & Yorksire Railway Co.6 following
Thorogood v. Bryan. The Court approved the leading case
and doubted Lishington's refusal to follow it in The Milan,
saying that by his use of the admiralty rule of divided dam-
ages he had in effect really approved it. The ruling case
which finally settled the question in English law was Mills et
al. v. Armstron et al., better known as "The Beinina", a
ruling in the House of Lords on an Appeal from the Court
of Appeal.
This case arose from injuries to passengers and non-navi-
gating officers in a collision caused by the negligent operation
of two ships. The defense was largely based on Thorogood
v. Bryan, and the final decision is largely a discussion of that
case. In his decision Lord Herschell said, "With the utmost
respect for these eminent judges, I must say I am unable to
comprehend this doctrine of identification. In what sense is
a passenger by a public stage-coach, because he avails himself
of the accommodation afforded by it, identified with the driver?
The learned judges manifestly do not mean to suggest (though
some of the language used would seem to bear that construc-
tion) that the passenger is so far identified with driver that
the negligence of the latter would render the former liable to
third persons injuredby it" ...... "In short, so far as I can
4. Lush. 388.
. L. R. 10 Ex. 47.
6. 13 App. Cases 1.
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see, the identification appears to be effective only to the ex-
tent of enabling another person whose servants have been
guilty of negligence to defend himself by the allegation of
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured."
He says further, speaking of the theory that the driver was
the servant of the passenger, "What kind of control has the
passenger over the driver which would make it reasonable to
hold the former for the negligence of the latter." Lord Wat-
son presented much the same reasoning. The decision of the
House, altho Lord Bramwell presented a strongly dissenting
opinion, was to the effect that the negligence of a person op-
erating any vehicle could not be imputed to a passenger ex-
ercising no control over the operation.
This case has settled the law of England on this subject,
and has exercised a profound influence on American opinion.
Turning to the United States, a direct conflict of authority
on this doctrine is found. A minority opinion follows the rule
of Thorogood v. Bryan, but the prevailing general rule over-
rides it on much the same grounds as those expressed in the
"Bernina." The general American rule may be stated thus:
When an accident occurs to a vehicle in which the plaintiff was
riding, thru the concurring negligence of the driver of a
vehicle and third parties, the negligence of the driver cannot
be imputed to the passenger. unless he was exercising some
control over the actions of the driver, either actual or pre-
sumed by law, and he may recover from the third party de-
spite the contributory negligence of his driver.
Hundreds of cases could be cited in support of this rule,
but it will be sufficient to discuss only a few showing the ex-
tent of the rule and the situations to which it has been applied.
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In the celebrated case of Little v. Hackett7 the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1885 expressly overruled Thoro-
good v. Bryan and held that the hirer of a public hack, giving
directions as to the route he wishes to cover, but exercising
no other control, does not assume the relation of master and
servant with the driver and can recover for his injuries de-
spite his driver's negligence. This fixes Federal law on this
point, never having been overruled by the Court, and also
indicates the extent of control to which the passenger may go
without assuming the relation of master.
Turning to the various State courts many decisions are to
be found indicating their approval of the American rule, and
the struggles some them had to reach it. An early case is
found in New York. In Masterson v. New York Central Rail-
road Co.8 that State held in 1888 that one riding by invitation
in the wagon of another was not debarred from recovery
against a railroad failing to maintain in good condition a
public crossing even tho the driver was negligent in not ob-
serving the condition of the crossing, provided that the driver
was sober and competent so far as the plaintiff's knowledge
went. There is no decision overruling this, altho it has been
qualified as will be explained later. As an indication of the
trouble of some of the States in getting to this ground, Penn-
sylvania can be taken as an example. The question arose in
1886, and caused the Court some trouble. In the earlier case
of Lockhart v. Lickenthaler9 the Court had followed Thoro-
good v. Bryan by ruling that a passenger on a common car-
rier injured thru the concurrent negligence of his carrier was
7. 116 U. S. 366.
8. 84 N. Y. 247.
9. 46 Pa. 151.
268
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barred from recovery against third parties, and must look to
his carrier alone for relief. Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane "
had dodged the issue by making a distinction between com-
mon carriers and private conveyances, In Dean v. Penns. RR
Co." the Court had expressed its disapproval of the whole
doctrine in a dictum, and finally in 1891 in Bunting v. Hog-
sett12 swept away all traces of the doctrine of imputed negli-
gence and permitted the passenger even on a common carrier
to recover fully. Iowa, too, had trouble with the doctrine and
had barred recover in several cases,"3 but the Supreme Court
of that State in Nesbit v. Town of Garner 4 considered these
cases carefully and came to the conclusion that they came
within the qualifications of the rule and that the negligence
of a driver could not bar an invited guest in the vehicle from
recovery against the town.
In Missouri there was little difficulty maintaining the gen-
eral rule as against the doctrine. The leading case in the
State upon this point was Beck v. Missouri Pacific Railway
Co. 5 decided in 1890, in which it was held unequivocally that
the negligence of the driver of a public stage coach in care-
lessly driving upon a railroad crossing in the dark without
looking could not be imputed to a passenger in the stage-
coach. The Court quoted from "The Bernina" with approval,
and, having the question before it for the first time for judic-
10. 113 Pa 514.
11. 129 Pa 526.
12. 12 L. R. A. 268.
13. 39 Iowa 523.
57 Ia. 748.
60 Ia. 429.
71 Ia. 209.
14. 75 Ia. 314.
15. 102 Mo. 544.
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ial determination approved the doctrine of that case, and
brought Missouri into line with the general rule. The next
Missouri case was that of Sluder v. St. Louis Travsit Co.10
in 1905 in which it was held that no relation of master and
servant is created between the hirer of a livery carriage and
its driver so as to impute the driver's negligence to the pas-
senger. Recent Missouri cases decided as late as 1925,17
while directly deciding cases which do impute the negligence
of the driver to the occupant uphold the main rule, and decide
these cases as exceptions to it.
Having noted the extent of the rule against this doctrine
of imputed negligence, it might be interesting to discover somp
of the reasons for it. In nearly all cases where this defense
is set up, an attempt is made to create the relation of master
and servant between the passenger and driver and then apply
the well-known rule of imputing the servant's negligence to
his master. The cases already discussed have indicated some
of the objections to this, and others are more specific. In the
Indiana case of The Town of Kiightsbridge v. Musgrove"'
the Court held that an invited passenger did not assume the
relation of master to the driver since he was merely a passive
guest, and exercised no control over the driver. In discussing
a theory that the possession of the vehicle by the passenger
made the driver his servant, the Court in the North Carolina
case of Duval v. Atlanfic Coast Line Railway Co.' 9 said:
"the possession of the passenger must be such as to supersede
16. 189 Mo. 107.
17. 266 S. W. 1015.
267 S. W. 12.
18. 116 Ind. 121.
19. 34 N. C. 331.
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for the time being the possession of the owner to the extent of
making the driver the temporary servant of the passenger."
In accordance vith this, it was held that a girl of fourteen
riding with her father bad not taken possession of the vehicle
to such an extent as to make him her actual temporary serv-
ant. Turning to Nebrasla, a good discussion of the creation
of the relation is had in Loso v. Lancaster County,20 where
it is held that in the case of a common carrier the operator
is the servant of the carrier and not of the passenger and
neither is the servant of the passenger. In the case of an
invited guest in a private conveyance, the Court said: "The
oiAner and driver of the team is not controlled by and is not
in any sense the servant of the invited guest, and to hold him
responsible for the negligence of the former, by whose per-
mission alone he rides is unauthorized by law and repugnant
to reason."
Having established the general rule the courts are reluc-
tant to allow immaterial qualifications of and exceptions to it.
One exception that is frequently urged is that of the age of
the injured occupant was such as to place him under the care
of the dliver, and lack of care for the infant by the driver
was a reason for imputing his negligence to the infant. But
in Kowalski v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co.2 the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals held that an infant child was
not charged with the negligence of his father. New York held
that an infant child held in its mother's lap and thrown from
thence by the negligence of its father who was driving could
not be held responsible for its father's negligence in Lewin
20. 109 N. W. 752.
21. 34 C. C. A. 1.
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v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 22 Other states have held that
a minor, thirteen years old and riding with his father was free
from any imputed negligence,23 that the negligence of the
driver could not be imputed to his sixteen year old daughter ;24
nor could the negligence of the plaintiff's employee who was
driving be imputed to tie minor son of the plaintiff, who was
riding with him.25 In the latest Missouri case20 decided in
the past six month, an infant child riding in its father's arms
was held not chargeable with the father's negligence.
The cases just cited show that not only has the age of the
injured person nothing to do with the cage, but neither does
the relationship of parent and child make the negligence of a
parent, driving, imputable to his child who is the occupant.
This doctrine has been extended further to hold that the sta-
tus of husband and wife will not affect the matter. Altho
some early cases hold differently the general present ruling
is expressed in two cases. In Indiana in the N. Y. C., & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Robbins27 the Court held that the existence of the
marriage relation alone does not charge the wife with her hus-
band's negligence, who at the time had the sole management
of the vehicle. And in Georgia the case of City of Cedartown
v. Brooks28 held that a wife could not be charged with her
husband's knowledge of dangerous defects in a bridge. How-
ever, the Federal courts hold differently on this subject in
22. 165 N. Y. 667.
23. 43 Ohio State 91.
24. 127 Mo. App. 577.
25. 175 Ia. 498.
26. 267 S. W. 382.
27. 38 Ind. App. 172.
28. 2 Ga. App. 583.
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the case of husband and wife29 as do the Delaware courts
where there is any family relation.30
The defendant in these cases where contributory negli-
gence of the driver is set up as a defense has attempted to
plead the negligence of a fellow-servant where two servants
of a common master, one the driver and the other the passen-
ger have been injured. The courts have uniformily ruled
against them where recovery was sought against a third per-
son and not against the common master.'
While the Courts have been reluctant to allow exceptions
to the general rule, yet there are certain well understood
and universally applied qualifications of it. The most com-
non of these arises under the master and servant rule where
such a relation actually exists. In the New York case of
Smith v. N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co. 32 it was held that when the
master surrendered complete control of the vehicle to his
servant, the negligence of the servant was imputable to his
master. The Missouri case of Markowitz v. Metropolitan
Street Railway Co.33 in which the mistress was ridhig in the
vehicle and directing the driver supported this.
While this principle is generally acknowledged it is some-
times difficult to decide when the relation has been created.
A South Dakota case, Van Horn v. Simpson34 held that two
29. 26 Fed. 22.
30. 14 AtI. 922.
31. 6 C. C. A. 281.
122 N. Y. 646.
83' Tex. 410.
18 111. 288.
110 Ill. 366.
212 Ill. 366.
n2. 39 N. Y. Sup. 1119.
33. 186 Mo. 350.
:14. 35 S. D. 640.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
partners engaged in partnership business, the one driving
was acting as the servant of the other. Two recent Missouri
cases establish the relation, one in Walker v. Mississippi
Bridge & Terminal Co.35 declaring that the negligence of the
plaintiff's hired chauffeur is the negligence of the plaintiff,
and the other in Rose v. Wells 30 holding that a wife acting as
her husband's chauffeur on his business trips was his agent.
Another important qualification is that persons engaged
in a common enterprise, altho not standing in the relation
of master and servant to each other, yet are so identified
with each other as to have the negligence of one imputed to
the other. This is illustrated by the case of Yanold v. Bower3 7
where two parties had engaged a row boat for a joint enter-
prise, and the one acting as passenger was injured through
the contributory negligence of the one rowing. It was held-
that he could not recover. The leading cases supporting this
principle are Koplitz v. City of St. Paul,33 Anthony v. Kief-
ner,39 and Christopherson V. Milwaukee, St. Paul & Saulte
Ste. Marie Railway Co., although none of them decide the
point directly but lay it down as dicta.
Perhaps the most important of these qualifications is the
rule that the passenger must not supinely trust the driver
when he knows of the danger but must exercise some degree
of care for his own safety. Accurately speaking, this is not
a real qualification of imputed negligence, but rests directly
on the actual contributory negligence of the passenger him-
35. 267 S. W. 12.
36. 266 S. W. 1015.
37. 186 Mass. 396.
38. 58 L. R. A. 74.
39. L. R. A. 1915F 876.
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sclf. Tn lIi(tell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Railroad Co.4 1 it was
said tlat here the occupant of the vehicle had the same op-
portunity to discover the darger as the driver the rule against
imputed negligence would not apply. In the City of Vincennes
v. Thuis4 2 it was held that a passenger who knowingly per-
mitted himself to be driven at a reckless and dangerous rate
was participating in the contiibutory negligence and could not
recover. Likewise in Warth v. Jackson County Court 3 and
occupant who with full knowledge of the dangers of the road
made no protest agairst LiLg driven over it was not per-
mnittd to recover. Lest this principle be carried too far,
however, it was stated by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals in Pyle v. Clark" that the passenger is not required
to use the same degree of care as driver. In other words,
while the primary duty to exercise due care rests upon the
driver and his failure to do so is not imputable to the occu-
pant, yet the latter must, when both have an equal opportunity
to see and avoid the danger, warn the driver and if rot able
to prevent his recklessness must at least protest it or he also
ixill be held guilty of contributory negligence.
Thus the rule has been established in both England and
America that the negligence of a driver cannot be imputed
to his passenger, subject to these three qualifications. The
overwhelming majority of the United States support the rule,
but we find three of them until recently flat-footedly against
the rule and in favor of the doctrine so far as it applies to
4). L. R. A. 1915A 761.
41. 120 N. Y. 290.
42. 28 Ind. App. 543.
43. 71 W. Va. 184.
44. L5 C. C. A. 190.
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private conveyance. These three are Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Montana. Since Michigan established the leading case
in support of the doctrine and was followed by Wisconsin
and Montana, although the later two have recently abrogated
it, it seems to be only proper to give her the doubtful honor
of designating the doctrine as the "Michigan rule."
The Michigan case cited as the leading authority on this
point is Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Co. v.
Miller45 decided in 1875. The Court seems to have held in-
cidentally without any direct reference that if the driver in
this case was negligent the plaintiff was negligent. In fact,
it seems to l:ave taken that for granted without any raising
of or discussion of the point. A study of the facts in the
case would seem to bring it rather under the third qualifica-
tion than really contrary to the rule. The plaintiff was in
the employ of one Eldridge and riding with him in a wagon.
They approached a railroad crossing, partly obstructed in
view. Eldridge v as deaf and could not hear the noise of the
train, although he could have heard it whistle, which was
proven not to have been blown. Neither he nor the plaintiff
paid any particular attention to the track, believing that no
train was due. Eldridge drove onto the track and the wagon
was struck, killing Eldridge and wounding the plaintiff.
Does not the fact that the plaintiff could have seen the danger
if she had tried, and-knowing Eldridge was somewhat deaf,
under a duty to exercise an extra degre of care have some
bearing on the real reason for this decisionl The next case
in point and the one which by upholding Railroad v. Miller
definitely established the Michigan rule was Muller v. City
40. Mich. 274.
46. 100 Mich. 143.
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of Ou'asso.46 This definitely asserts that when a person ar-
rives at the age of discretion and voluntarily enters a private
conveyance the negligence of the driver is to be imputed to
the occupant, and cites Railroad v. Miller supra as settling
the question. It is admitted that the doctrine is not to be
applied to children not of the age of discretion ns there ,r
implied compulsion on their actions. Four judges concurred
in this decision. A strong dissenting opinion, however, was
filed by Judge Hooker who pointed out that by tbis time
(1894) Thorogood v. Bryan was thoroughly discredited. He
also points out a distinction, which is the third qualification
of the majority rule, in which he admits that because one
person happens to be driving a vehicle does not relieve the
other from taking care for his own safety and insist the
Railroad v. Miller was decided on this ground. In 1904 the
Coult in Hem pel v. Detroit, Grand Rapids & Western Rail-
road47 rejected the doctrine as applied to infants but said
that there was no question of the authority of Railroad v.
Miller in the case of adults. Later cases uphold the doctrine
likewise, but a recent case, Robertson v. United Fuel & Sup-
ply Co.4s has started to mitigate the severity of the rule by
adopting a qualification which holds that a servant riding in
a vehicle, in line of duty, driven by his master is not charge-
able with his master's negligence. Evidently proceeding on
the same theory of compulsion which relaxed the doctrine in
favor of minor children.
For a long time Wisconsin followed Michigan taking Pri-
deux v. City of Mineral Poit4D in 1878 as the authority on
47. 138 Mich. 1.
48. -187 N. W. 30-0.
49. 43 Wis. 514.
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the doctrine. This held that one riding in a private vehile
makes the driver his agent, for he has the election of going
or not going anI he voluntarily submits to the other making
himself an a-2ent. The case admits a distinction with a com-
mon carrier, Lolding that in this age, there is no question of
a voluntary submission since one must ride on a common
carrier if compelled to go some place and has no private
vehicle. Ot.s v. Town of Janesville" and Lighvfoot v. Winne-
bago Traction Co.51 uphold this doctrine, but the recent case
of Reiter v. Grober et al.52 decided in 1921 expressly over-
rules Prideux v. City of Mineral Point and brings Wisconsin
into line with the general rule.
The question was decided in Montana by the Michigan
rule in 1894 in Whittaker v. Ci$y of Helana"8 which held that
one voluntarily entrusting himself to the care of another in
driving a vehicle made the latter his agent by implication.
However recently Montana came into line in Sherris v. North.
ern Pacific Railway Co.54 which concedes the doctrine of ini.
puted negligence to be unsound, although only as dicta, foi
the case is decided on another point. This leaves only Mich-
igan upholding the Michigan rule, and that State is weakening
on it, so one may confidently predict that within a short time
it "ill te cxeiruled there by decision or statute and all
American jurisdiction will declare that there is no such thing
as imputed r.egiigence as applied to the occupant of a vehicle.
WARREN TURNER, '27.
50. 47 Wiz. 422.
51. 123 Wis. 479.
52. 181 N. W. 739.
53. 14 IYont. 124.
54. 175 Pac. 269.
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